





























































































































































































































I estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for the Federal Reserve
for the periods before and after Paul Volcker’s appointment as Chairman in 1979,
using information that was available to the FOMC in real time from 1966 to 1995. The
results suggest broad similarities in policy and point to a forward looking approach
to policy consistent with a strong reaction to inﬂation forecasts during both periods.
This contradicts the hypothesis, based on analysis with ex post constructed data, that
the instability of the Great Inﬂation was the result of weak FOMC policy responses
to expected inﬂation. A diﬀerence is that prior to Volcker’s appointment, policy
was too activist in reacting to perceived output gaps that retrospectively proved
overambitious. Drawing on contemporaneous accounts of FOMC policy, I discuss the
implications of the ﬁndings for alternative explanations of the Great Inﬂation and the
improvement in macroeconomic stability since then.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E3, E52, E58.




The performance of the U.S. economy during the past two decades has been impres-
sive. From the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, the economy steadily expanded
(with but a brief interruption in 1990), while inﬂation remained fairly stable and sub-
dued. The 1980s marked what was the longest peacetime expansion on record, only
to be followed by the longest expansion ever. The “Long Boom” aptly describes this
exceptionally long period of stability and growth (Taylor, 1998). By contrast, the
essence of the ﬁfteen or so years before the Long Boom, in one word, is “stagﬂation.”
This single word describes both the perception of stagnation throughout the 1970s
and also the Great Inﬂation, which started in the mid-1960s and became increasingly
more virulent during the 1970s.
What accounts for this dramatic change in economic outcomes, from the instability of
the Great Inﬂation, to the steady expansion of the Long Boom? Broadly, explanations
fall into two not mutually exclusive strands, those emphasizing possible changes in
the structure of the economy and those emphasizing changes in policy.1 From a policy
perspective, explanations that emphasize the role of policy are of particular interest.
To the extent a change in policy has contributed to such a drastic improvement in
economic well-being, proper identiﬁcation of the policy mistakes that were presumably
corrected, or, more generally, of the characteristics of policy during the period of
superior performance, would be of great economic signiﬁcance. After all, the single
most signiﬁcant contribution of historical policy analysis is perhaps to identify and
help avoid the repetition of past mistakes.
A number of alternative hypotheses for how a policy change may have contributed to
the improvement in macroeconomic performance during the Long Boom have been
advanced. One widely known view is the result of recent inﬂuential studies on mon-
etary policy rules, notably Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) (henceforth CGG) and
Taylor (1999a).2 This view emphasizes the important insight that successful mone-
tary policy requires a strong response to expected inﬂation, such that an increase in
expected inﬂation prompts a more than proportional increase of short-term nominal
1Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2001), Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Kahn, McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2001) among others, emphasize helpful changes in the structure of the economy or a reduction
in the frequency of disruptive disturbances as the primary sources of the improvement. Blanchard
and Simon identify a decline in volatility starting in the 1950s—interrupted in the 1970s and early
1980s. Kahn et al. stress improvements in information technologies since about 1984. Ahmed et al.
identify a reduced variance of exogenous shocks since about that time as the most important but not
the only source of improvement.
2See Blinder (1979), De Long (1997), Mayer (1999) and references therein for earlier investigations
of the role of policy for the unfavorable outcomes associated with the Great inﬂation.	
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interest rates. CGG and Taylor argue that the diﬀerence in performance from the
Great Inﬂation to the Long Boom can be squarely traced to a shift in this response
associated with Paul Volcker’s appointment as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in
1979. In essence, these authors argue that during the Great Inﬂation the Federal
Reserve pursued a policy that accommodated inﬂation and induced instability in the
economy by lowering real interest rates when expected inﬂation increased and vice
versa. This perverse practice, they suggest, ended with Volcker’s appointment as
Chairman, thus restoring monetary stability in the economy.3
An alternative view on how policy may have improved since the Great Inﬂation iden-
tiﬁes changes in the response of policy to economic activity, as opposed to expected
inﬂation. In this view, policy was excessively activist during the Great Inﬂation, a
result of policymaker overconﬁdence in their ability to stabilize deviations of output
from the economy’s potential supply—the output gap.4 As shown by Orphanides
(1998), if policymakers mistakenly adopt policies that are optimal under the pre-
sumption that their understanding of the state of the economy is accurate when, in
fact, such accuracy is lacking, they inadvertently induce instability in both inﬂation
and economic activity.5 According to this view, the instability associated with the
Great Inﬂation was the unintended outcome of excessively activist policies chasing
output targets that proved overambitious, retrospectively. By the end of the 1970s,
the instability and inﬂationary impetus of these activist policies was ﬁnally recognized
and policy subsequently improved by becoming less activist.
The behavior of inﬂation since the 1960s oﬀers indisputable evidence that monetary
policy was highly accommodative during the Great Inﬂation but much less so after-
wards. Figure 1 compares the behavior of inﬂation and the federal funds rate from
3Other studies, some building directly on the CGG empirical results, have advanced related ar-
guments. For example, Christiano and Gust (2000) emphasize that a high inﬂation expectations
trap can arise if policy accommodates inﬂation as suggested by CGG for the 1970s. Because of the
attention that has been received by the CGG results, in particular, I focus my discussion here on
that analysis.
4This concern is based on the well known monetarist criticism against activist control of the
economy—the “monetarists” versus “activists” debate. See the essays collected in Friedman (1953)
for early expositions of the issue and Meltzer (1987) for a more recent exposition. Its potential
for understanding the improvement in macroeconomic performance since the Great Inﬂation has
been recently investigated in the context of interest rate policy rules by Orphanides (1998, 2000).
The problems associated with designing monetary policy without adequate treatment of uncertainty
regarding real-time assessments of the output gap (and the closely related “unemployment gap”) have
been recently emphasized in a number studies, including, Estrella and Mishkin (1999), McCallum
(2001), McCallum and Nelson (1999), Orphanides et al. (2000), Smets (1998) and Wieland (1998).
5The empirical evidence, brieﬂy reviewed in section 3, indicates that assessments of the economy’s
productive potential have historically been quite inaccurate. During the 1970s, in particular, misper-
ceptions regarding adverse shifts in trend productivity resulted in outsized errors and overoptimistic
assessments of the economy’s potential.	
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1966 to 1995. As is evident, the federal funds rate was consistently much higher than
inﬂation since the late 1970s than it was earlier. This change is suggestive of a dra-
matic reversal in policy at that time. It also conﬁrms an important element of both
hypotheses mentioned above. To identify more precisely whether and how monetary
policy diﬀered before and after Volcker’s appointment, CGG estimate and compare
forward-looking monetary policy rules responding to the outlook of inﬂation and eco-
nomic activity for each era. Their estimation also suggests that, even after controlling
for policy responses to economic activity, the Federal Reserve adjusted real interest
rates in a perverse manner prior to Volcker’s appointment but not after. In their es-
timation, however, CGG do not employ information that was available to the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) when monetary policy decisions were made but
instead rely on ex post constructed data as proxies. As they carefully acknowledge,
this raises some questions regarding the interpretation of the results.6 Indeed, CGG
conclude that the fundamental problem they raise for the Great Inﬂation is that the
Federal Reserve maintained persistently low short-term real interest rates in the face
of high inﬂation; they also point to other possibilities for the cause of this mistake,
including the alternative view mentioned earlier.
Given the signiﬁcance of an accurate interpretation of possible changes in policy after
the Great Inﬂation, in this paper I revisit the issue and examine the evolution of
monetary policy from the 1960s to the 1990s using exclusively information that was
available to the FOMC when policy decisions were made. Speciﬁcally, I estimate a
forward-looking monetary policy reaction function such as proposed by CGG for the
periods before and after Paul Volcker’s appointment as Chairman in 1979 using this
real-time information.
Estimation results suggest broad similarities in policy over the two periods. In par-
ticular, and in contradiction to ﬁndings based on the ex post constructed data, the
evidence points to a forward looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reac-
tion to inﬂation forecasts both before and after Volcker’s appointment as Chairman.
This suggests that policymakers during the Great Inﬂation did not commit an error as
6In particular, this practice can lead to misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the
behavior suggested by information available to policymakers in real time. For a detailed discussion of
these pitfalls in the context of policy rules such as those examined by Taylor and CGG see Orphanides
(2001). Brieﬂy, the main diﬃculty arises from the fact that monetary policy decisions are based on
and reﬂect policymaker perceptions of the state of the economy at the time policy is made. As a
result, to correctly identify behavior, it is imperative to account for the evolution of these perceptions
in real time and not simply rely on the actual evolution of the state of the economy as recognized ex
post. Obviously, when perceptions and reality match closely, the distinction may be inconsequential.




egregious as the perverse response to inﬂation would suggest. The evidence, however,
does not absolve monetary policy from the macroeconomic instability experienced
during the Great Inﬂation. As I discuss, the policy rule describing policy during the
Great Inﬂation was excessively activist in its response to the output gap, especially
in light of the outsized misperceptions regarding potential output that were only un-
derstood much later. By contrast, the evidence suggests that policy after 1979 did
not exhibit the same degree of activism, resulting in a reduction of emphasis to the
output gap relative to inﬂation in setting policy. Contemporaneous accounts pro-
vide additional support for the view that an intentional reduction in policy activism
along these lines followed Paul Volcker’s appointment as Federal Reserve Chairman.
The policy record suggests that rapidly changing economic developments during 1979
forced a critical reconsideration of policy that year. This subtle policy improvement
in the aftermath of the Great Inﬂation contributed to the improved macroeconomic
performance of the Long Boom.
2 Forward-looking Policy Rules
2.1 Speciﬁcation
I consider a family of simple linear rules with the federal funds rate as the policy
instrument. Brieﬂy, these rules specify that monetary policy decisions are mainly
driven by two factors, the outlook for inﬂation, as measured by the rate of change
of the output deﬂator, and the outlook for real economic activity, as measured by
the deviation of output from the economy’s potential supply—the output gap. This
family of rules was ﬁrst examined in detail in the policy regime evaluation project
reported in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993). As they explained, this speciﬁcation
was motivated by the “stated dual objective of many central banks to achieve a
sustainable growth in real activity while avoiding inﬂation,” (p. 225), which also
broadly describes the stated policy objectives of the Federal Reserve over the past
several decades. Following an inﬂuential study by Taylor (1993), these rules are
commonly referred to as “Taylor rules.” Over the past several years, a vast literature
has spawned examining various variants of these policy rules from theoretical and
empirical perspectives and their usefulness remains an area of active research.7 For
the purposes of this study, I limit my attention to simple forward-looking variants
7See Ball (1999), CGG (1999), Hetzel (2000), McCallum (1999), Taylor(1999b), Williams (1999),
Woodford (2000), and references therein. Particularly relevant for forward-looking variants of these
policy rules, such as examined here, is the work of Amato and Laubach (1999), Batini and Haldane
(1999), Batini and Nelson (2000), Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999, 2000), Nessen (1999), Rude-
busch and Svensson (1999), and Smets (2000). These forward-looking rules also provide a useful
analytical framework for the inﬂation targeting approach to policy, as discussed in Bernanke and
Mishkin (1997), Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1998), and Svensson (1997, 1999).	
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along the lines examined by CGG, which have served as the focus of recent historical
policy comparisons.8
Let f∗
t denote the notional target for the federal funds rate for quarter t, yt|t the
outlook for the output gap for quarter t, as perceived during the quarter, and πt,i|t
the outlook for inﬂation, speciﬁcally for the average rate of inﬂation from quarter t
to quarter t+i, also as perceived during quarter t.9 The rules I examine specify that
the notional target for the federal funds rate evolves according to:
f∗
t = α + βπt,i|t + γyt|t
Here, β reﬂects the responsiveness of policy to expected inﬂation and γ the respon-
siveness of policy to real economic activity. As can be easily seen, β>1 reﬂects a
policy that raises real rates with inﬂation, a response that is generally stabilizing,
while β<1 indicates the perverse response of reducing real rates when expected in-
ﬂation rises, which is generally destabilizing.10 The role of the remaining parameter,
α, is most clearly seen by noting that in steady state, inﬂation is equal to the policy
target, π∗, and the output gap is equal to zero. Letting r∗ denote the equilibrium
real interest rate, the policy rule above implies: α = r∗ − (β − 1)π∗.T h u s ,α reﬂects
a linear combination of the equilibrium real rate and the inﬂation target and is equal
to the equilibrium real rate in the special case of a zero inﬂation target.
The actual federal funds rate for the quarter, ft, reﬂects movements of the notional
target, f∗
t , possibly with a degree of partial adjustment, ρ ∈ [0,1),11
ft = ρft−1 +( 1− ρ)f∗
t + ηt.
The error, ηt, is assumed to reﬂect other factors that might inﬂuence the federal funds
rate during the quarter, independent of the inﬂation and economic activity outlook.
8This sidesteps a number of possibly important issues relating to the speciﬁcation of the rule.
For example, it rules out the presence of nonlinearities, such as suggested from time to time by
FOMC members themselves and examined, among others by, Blinder (1997), CGG(1999), Orphanides
and Wilcox (1996) and Orphanides and Wieland (2000). Also, it does not address diﬀerences in
speciﬁcation within linear rules which may inﬂuence interpretations of historical policy changes. For
example, Sims (1999) and Fair (2001) suggest that the evidence for a policy change associated with
Volcker’s appointment as Chairman is weak, based on the policy rule speciﬁcations they examine.
9For any variable X, I use the notation Xt|τ to denote perceptions of the value of the variable for
quarter t held at quarter τ. For inﬂation and output data, this involves a forecast when τ ≤ t and
actual data (though always subject to revision) for τ>t .
10Stability conditions diﬀer depending on model speciﬁc details. In some models, stability is
possible with values of β slightly smaller than one and γ>0. See Christiano and Gust (2000),
CGG (1999), Kerr and King (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and Woodford (2000), for
examinations in alternative models with optimizing behavior.
11Here, ρ can be interpreted as an indicator of interest rate smoothing. See Sack and Wieland




Combining the notional target and partial adjustment equations yields the following
policy reaction function:
ft = ρft−1 +( 1− ρ)(α + βπt,i|t + γyt|t)+ηt. (1)
2.2 Real-Time Information
In estimating a policy reaction function such as (1), the objective is to describe how
policy responded over time to the outlook of inﬂation and economic activity as un-
derstood when policy decisions were made. Ideally, to capture the intent of policy
as closely as possible, estimation of (1) should be based on consistent forecasts of
inﬂation and the output gap, as formed by policymakers themselves, and reﬂecting
concepts of these variables with uniform meanings over time. In practice, several
complications need to be addressed. Monetary policy in the United States is de-
cided by the Federal Open Market Committee. Although individual members of the
Committee have sometimes oﬀered their views of the outlook, there does not exist a
consistent record of the Committee’s quantitative assessment of the economic outlook
at the time most decisions are made. However, a detailed record of policy discussions
and information presented to the Committee by Federal Reserve Board staﬀ at reg-
ularly scheduled meetings is available. Since the end of 1965, when the staﬀ started
the systematic preparation of quarterly forecasts for the FOMC, discussion of the
outlook of the economy has been organized around these forecasts. Thus, to reﬂect
information regarding the economic outlook as available to the FOMC as closely as
possible, I rely on these forecasts and information associated with them. Speciﬁcally,
for each quarter from 1966Q1 to 1995Q4, I collected information corresponding to
the Greenbook prepared during (or, when not available by) the middle month of the
quarter.12 For each quarter, I collected information regarding the concepts of “nom-
inal output”, “real output” and “potential output” or “output gap,” which I used
to construct time series for πt,i|t and yt|t. This requires some additional speciﬁcity
because the exact deﬁnitions of these concepts has changed over time and, at times,
multiple concepts have been put forth. The guiding principle I employed was to use,
in each quarter, concepts corresponding to the headline concept for “real output” as
deﬁned by the Commerce Department during that quarter. Thus the data reﬂect
shifts in the concept of “nominal output” from GNP to GDP during the sample and
various redeﬁnitions of “real output” to correspond to alternative deﬂators over time.
For “potential output,” I use the oﬃcial government estimates corresponding to the
12I start in 1966Q1 because systematic one-quarter-ahead forecasts were not presented in the
Greenbook before December 1965. I end in 1995Q4 because more recent forecasts were not available





relevant concept of “real output” as available to Federal Reserve staﬀ until 1980 and
internal Federal Reserve staﬀ estimates since then. (These data are from Orphanides,
2000).
As already mentioned, the quarterly dataset constructed in this way is not ideal.
However, it oﬀers a characterization of perceptions regarding the outlook for inﬂation
and the output gap relevant for setting policy that is arguably as close as is possible,
based on the available historical record. Further, a reading of the record of FOMC
deliberations suggests that policy discussions since the 1960s have revolved around
the outlook of economic activity and inﬂation in a way that could be informed by
these data with rather surprising continuity.
To illustrate this point, it is instructive to compare the following two examples from
policy deliberations, separated by nearly thirty years in time but selected to capture
monetary policy turning points under roughly similar economic conditions. The ﬁrst
reﬂects comments by Vice Chairman McDonough from the February 1994 FOMC
meeting and also illustrates the role of the Greenbook forecasts as a focal point for
the discussion regarding the economic outlook.
With regard to the national forecast, we are rather similar to the Green-
book with some exceptions. ... In general, we think the gap between
actual and potential GDP is now quite small, and certainly that which
remains will be used up in the course of 1994 with our forecast, the Green-
book’s, or any of those we’ve heard around the table. Consequently, with
the unemployment rate coming down to what we think is a reasonable
estimate of the NAIRU—in the low 6 percent area—we do have to be
considerably concerned about inﬂation.
...
I believe very strongly that we should ﬁrm policy and that we should do so
today... We are very near potential GDP and all of our forecasts, whether
they are ﬁne-tunings of the Greenbook or right on it, say that we will
reach full potential this year.
The second example reﬂects comments by Vice Chairman Hayes during the Novem-
ber 1965 meeting, about the time discussion of staﬀ forecasts became an important
element of Committee meetings.
With the likelihood that GNP will be growing at a rate of around $11-12
billion per quarter in 1966, the gap between actual and potential levels of





[T]he time has come for an overt move to signal a ﬁrmer monetary policy
... [W]e are probably very close to the point where continued sustain-
able domestic expansion depends on greater eﬀort to keep inﬂationary
pressures under control.
Despite some diﬀerences, the considerations and rationale for taking policy action in
these two instances would appear to be remarkably similar.
These examples also point to the forward-looking nature of policy, conﬁrming that
forward-looking speciﬁcations for a policy rule are likely most appropriate for describ-
ing policy throughout this period. The appropriate horizon is less clear, especially for
the early period, so I estimate equation (1) for four horizons, i = {1,...,4}. Because
early Greenbooks only reported very short-run forecasts, however, the coverage of
data for the 1960s and early 1970s is increasingly less complete as the horizon length-
ens. Data are missing for 2, 10, 18 and 26 observations respectively for the one-, two-,
three- and four-quarter-ahead horizons.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a graphical illustration of the data for the one-quarter ahead
forecast horizon. Figure 2 plots the inﬂation forecast together with the ex ante real
federal funds rate corresponding to that forecast. Figure 3 plots the output gap
together with the same ex ante real interest rate series. Broadly, ﬂuctuations in the
real interest rate point to comovements with both the expected inﬂation and output
gap series, suggesting that estimation of a policy rule such as equation (1) could oﬀer
an informative summary description of policy decisions. I return to these two ﬁgures
later on.
2.3 Estimation
Table 1 presents estimation results for equation (1). For each forecast horizon, i =
{1,...,4}, two sets of estimates are presented, one set with data ending with 1979Q2
(prior to Volcker’s appointment as Chairman) and the second starting with 1979Q3.
Three observations are in order. First, for both samples, the estimated policy rules ﬁt
the data about as well and suggest rather similar policy responses to the output gap
and expected inﬂation for the alternative forecast horizons. Second, concentrating on
the estimated response to inﬂation, β, the estimates exceed one in both samples and
are only slightly higher in the sample starting with Volcker’s appointment. In this
sense, the policy response to expected inﬂation, appears broadly similar in both peri-
ods. Third, concentrating on the estimated response to the output gap, γ, estimates




for the sample starting with Volcker’s appointment. In this sense, policy appears to
have been more activist during the Great Inﬂation than later.
To examine more precisely whether and how the policy rules for the two periods diﬀer
in a statistically signiﬁcant sense, I estimated equation (1) for the whole sample and
examined restrictions on the constancy of some or all of the policy rule parameters in
the two periods. Results are reported in Table 2. Examining all parameters (ﬁrst row
in the table) suggested rejections of the joint constancy hypothesis, at the 10% level for
the one-quarter-ahead horizon, at the 5% level (but barely) for the two-quarter-ahead
horizon, and tighter levels for the longer horizons. Examining the parameters one at
time, while restricting remaining parameters to be constant across periods, suggested
a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in only one parameter, γ. (This is reﬂected in
the fourth row in the table.) For all horizons, the response to the output gap was
signiﬁcantly smaller in the sample starting with Volcker’s appointment as Chairman.
No evidence of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the response to expected inﬂation, β,w a s
present (third row). Surprisingly, constancy of α could not be rejected either, as
would be expected if the inﬂation target or equilibrium real interest rate had changed
signiﬁcantly (at least in the linear combination r∗ − (β − 1)π∗).
Figure 4 plots the notional targets implied by the parameter estimates for the one-
quarter ahead inﬂation. These permit a counterfactual comparison of the suggested
setting for the federal funds rate, conditioning on the outlook for inﬂation and eco-
nomic activity perceived at each quarter from 1966Q1 to 1995Q4. One interesting
observation is that the two rules are not very diﬀerent in the ﬁrst few and last several
years in the sample. They do diﬀer substantially from about 1974 to about 1985, with
the rule estimated for the pre-Volcker period providing systematically easier policy
prescriptions. The main diﬀerence, again, is that the rule estimated for the period
after Volcker’s appointment, would not have suggested as large a policy ease as was
adopted in practice in response to the severe downturn and recovery associated with
the 1974 recession. Similarly, it did not suggest as large a policy ease as the earlier
rule would have suggested in response to the downturn and recovery associated with
either the 1980 or 1982 recessions. This tighter policy, of course, was the driving force
behind the stabilization of inﬂation in the early 1980s.
In summary, the estimated policy rules suggest broad similarities in policy before and
after Volcker’s appointment as Chairman in 1979, with only a rather subtle (though





3.1 Output Gap Misperceptions
Given the importance of the policy response to perceived output gaps apparent in
the estimation results above, it is useful to examine the evolution of these perceptions
over time in order to gain a better understanding of the historical evolution of policy.
As discussed in detail in Orphanides (2000), contemporaneous perceptions of the
output gap during the period covered in this sample exhibited serious ﬂaws. An
important source of diﬃculty was the failure to recognize suﬃciently quickly the
persistent adverse shifts in trend productivity in the economy that were experienced
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.13 As a result, estimates of potential output
during this period appeared consistently more optimistic than what could be justiﬁed
based on ex post data. Throughout the 1970s, output appeared to fall short of the
economy’s potential supply, increasingly so in the early and mid 1970s.14 Ex post, this
gradual deterioration in the economy’s prospects can be captured by approximating
potential output, for example, by using a quadratic time trend or a smooth trend
such as based on the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
To assess the pattern of output gap misperceptions in this sample, Figure 5 provides a
comparison of the real-time perceptions of the output gap with two ex post constructs.
These are based on current data for GDP detrended over the 1966 to 1995 sample
using the HP ﬁlter and a quadratic time trend, respectively. I selected these two
methods as representative of alternatives that are frequently employed, also noting
that these two have been employed for estimating policy rules with ex post data,
including by CGG (1998, 2000) and Taylor (1999a).15
The HP and quadratic trends produce very similar results over this sample. As a
result, I concentrate my comparisons of the real-time series with the ex post concept
13In a detailed study of oﬃcial real-time output gap estimates in the United Kingdom, Nelson
and Nikolov (2001) report a remarkably similar pattern of errors in that country. Given that many
industrialized countries experienced a slowdown in productivity during the 1960s and 1970s, it is
likely that similar patterns may characterize errors in the measurement of the output gap in some of
these countries as well. To the extent monetary policy in these countries exhibited activism similar
to that exhibited by the Federal Reserve, these misperceptions could explain, at least in part, the
common rise and fall in inﬂation observed in so many countries from the 1960s to the 1990s.
14Errors associated with the GNP data as originally reported by the Commerce Department also
contributed importantly to the problem. For example, Orphanides (2000b) shows that these errors
can account for about 5 percentage points of the mismeasurement of the output gap in 1975.
15However, it is well known that neither of these methods is useful for real-time analysis due to
the lack of reliability of the resulting end-of-sample trend estimates. See Orphanides and van Norden




based on the quadratic trend which is also the one favored by CGG. Using this gap
as a reference series suggests a number of interesting observations regarding the real-
time output gap perceptions. First, the real-time series is very similar to the ex post
construct at the beginning and end of the sample. The two series also exhibit similar
comovements with the business cycle, registering cyclical peaks and troughs at about
the same times. But the real-time series diverges from the ex post construct from the
late 1960s to the mid 1970s before the two series slowly converge again over the late
1970s and 1980s. The divergence suggests a U-shaped pattern of misperceptions, with
a low point around 1975. This, of course, is the pattern that would be expected with a
process of gradual learning of the reduction in potential output growth associated with
the deterioration of trend productivity in the economy that was experienced during
the late 1960s and early 1970s.16 One would also expect that such misperceptions
would lead to systematic errors in inﬂation forecasts. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure
6, inﬂation forecasts systematically underpredicted inﬂation during the late 1960s and
early 1970s.17
Elements of this comparison prove useful as a device for reconciling diﬀerences in
alternative interpretations of the historical evolution of policy and macroeconomic
outcomes.
3.2 Correlations and Biases
The estimated policy parameters of a linear policy reaction function such as (1), reﬂect
the correlation patterns of the underlying data. One way to understand diﬀerences
between the results in Table 1 and those based on ex post constructed data is to
compare relevant correlations of the real-time and ex post constructs. Consider, for
example, alternative estimates of the parameter β which is the critical parameter for
the hypothesis that the policy response to inﬂation was perverse during the period
before Volcker’s appointment. To that end, compare the estimates for the one-quarter
ahead inﬂation forecast, the case i = 1 in Table 1, with the corresponding estimates
reported by CGG using quadratic trend concepts of the output gap.18 CGG (1998)
and CGG (2000) report estimates of 0.80 and 0.75 for β, respectively. By contrast,
16Note that because the sample ends in 1995, these data do not reﬂect the reversal of this de-
terioration in trend productivity that was experienced in the late 1990s. Of course, the quadratic
detrending concept described here would be totally inappropriate for examining that reversal.
17This is evident from comparisons of the forecasts with either current data (as shown in the ﬁgure)
or ﬁrst-published data. Mayer (1999) oﬀers a detailed analysis of the inﬂation forecast errors during
this period.
18Note that CGG use the subscript t + 1 to denote output produced during period t.I n s t e a d , I
employ the usual timing convention. Thus, yt|t refers to the output gap for quarter t which matches




the estimate in Table 1 above is about twice as large, 1.64.
An important diﬀerence, in this case, is associated with the correlation of the output
gap with the inﬂation forecasts. The ex post gap based on quadratic detrending is
not correlated with the inﬂation forecast series. The correlation coeﬃcient in the
1966Q1 to 1979Q2 sample is 0.04. By contrast, the real-time output gap series ex-
hibits a signiﬁcant negative correlation with the inﬂation forecast series −0.54.19 The
implications of this diﬀerence on estimated policy parameters are easy to see. Since β
and γ are positive, if policymakers in real time responded strongly to both expected
inﬂation and the output gap, omitting the real-time gap from the estimation of the
policy rule would lead to a downward bias in the estimate of β. And this downward
bias in estimating β would remain if the ex post construct were used in place of the
real-time gap, since the ex post construct is uncorrelated with expected inﬂation. To
illustrate the signiﬁcance of this bias, I re-estimated equation (1) imposing the restric-
tion γ = 0. The resulting estimate of β was below one, 0.94 to be exact, conﬁrming
a substantial downward bias.
Returning to Figures 2 and 3, concentrating on the movements of expected inﬂation,
the real interest rate and the output gap up to mid-1979, provides a visual rendition
of this argument. The data suggest that two forces were pulling increasingly the real
interest rate in opposite directions with roughly equal force. While rising inﬂation
suggested that the real rate should be raised, perceptions that the economy was
getting further away from its potential suggested a reduction of the real rate was in
order. The policy rule estimated for the Great Inﬂation period indicates that policy
responded strongly to both of these concerns, and balanced them nearly one for one.
By contrast, the pattern of correlations in the two ﬁgures changes somewhat after
mid-1979, indicative of the relatively greater emphasis on expected inﬂation reﬂected
in the estimated policy rule.
3.3 Inﬂation and Disinﬂation
The strong response to perceived output gaps coupled with the pattern of mispercep-
tions suggested in Figure 4, provide a straightforward explanation for the acceleration
of inﬂation, especially during the 1970s. To see this, it is useful to examine how far
from the inﬂation target, π∗, the economy would settle if policy responded to an
output gap persistently measured with an error equal to −x (deﬁned so that x>0
measures an overoptimistic assessment of the economy). Recall that in the absence
19This collinearity also explains the relatively large standard errors in Table 1, despite the high




of such a systematic error, the rule implies that in steady state, r∗ + π∗ = α + βπ∗.
With a persistent error, −x, the corresponding steady state rate of inﬂation would
be π∗x such that r∗ + π∗x = α + βπ∗x − γx. Bringing these two together yields:
π∗x − π∗ =
γ
(β−1)x.T h u s ,t h er a t i o
γ
(β−1) provides a useful index of the inﬂationary
consequences of a persistent overoptimistic assessment of the economy, indicating by
how much (in percent) inﬂation would be expected to deviate from its target if the
output gap were persistently believed to be one percent below its true value.
The inﬂationary potential associated with sustained overoptimistic assessments of
the economy’s potential supply diﬀers importantly for the rules followed during and
after the Great Inﬂation. To illustrate the extent of these diﬀerences, Table 3 shows
the values for this index corresponding to the policy reaction functions estimated in
Table 1. As can be seen, the index has values around 1 for the policy rules describing
the Great Inﬂation but only about one quarter as high for the post-1979 sample. (The
data reject the hypothesis that the index is constant over the two samples, for all
forecast horizons.) Noting that real-time misperceptions of the output gap averaged
−4.9percent in the sample to mid-19 79and −3.6 percent later on, we can use the
index to obtain a rough estimate for the extent of the inﬂationary bias embedded in
the policies followed during the two subsamples. Using the index corresponding to the
one-quarter ahead forecast horizon, suggests an inﬂationary bias of about 4.4 percent
before mid-1979. That is, if policymakers implemented policy aiming towards a long-
run inﬂation target of 2 percent, their actions were actually pushing the economy
to an inﬂation rate above 6 percent. This bias would have been much smaller, 1.7
percent, if the policy rule describing the post-1979 period was in place. Likewise,
the inﬂationary bias for the post-1979 period is only about 1.2 percent but would
have been considerably larger, about 3.2 percent, had the policy rule describing the
pre-1979 period been in place. Thus, there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the two
policy rules which have important implications for understanding the Great Inﬂation
and subsequent disinﬂation.
3.4 Stop-Go Policy Instability
In addition to generating high average inﬂation, the excessive activism exhibited by
policy during the Great Inﬂation, coupled with the increasingly optimistic assess-
ments of potential economic activity in the early 1970s, increased instability in the
economy. Mixing these two ingredients is essential for understanding the problem.
Under ideal conditions, activist policies such as followed during the Great Inﬂation




perceived output gaps. However, this requires a solid understanding of the structure
of the economy and reliable assessments of the economy’s potential. With that in
place, deviations of actual output from potential output can, in principle at least, be
a useful guide for setting policy. But what if this guide is error prone, as happened
so systematically during the 1970s? Then, following the activist policies deemed eﬃ-
cient under the presumption of accuracy, can lead policymakers to a futile chase of the
wrong target. The result, is a pattern of stop-go policy reversals that retrospectively
appear to be out of sync with the economic fundamentals. Retrospectively, policy
keeps falling “behind the curve.”
A formal accounting of the role of persistent output gap misperceptions in generating
instability, when policy follows an activist interest rate policy rule such as (1), re-
quires comparisons based on an estimated model and estimates of the persistence and
magnitude of historical misperceptions. Orphanides (1998) presents such comparisons
and his results provide a useful perspective for the diﬀerences one could expect from
the rules estimated here before and after Volcker’s appointment. The model is suf-
ﬁciently simple so that policy rules such as (1) are optimal for a policymaker who
values inﬂation and output stability. Using the 1980s and early 1990s as a benchmark
period, Orphanides shows the degree of instability induced when policy follows an ac-
tivist rule that is optimal with perfect information when, in fact, mismeasurement is
present, and computes eﬃcient rules that properly account for mismeasurement. To
illustrate the diﬀerences in the alternative rules, it is useful to compare how activist
they are in terms of the index described earlier, γ/(β − 1). For a policymaker who
places equal emphasis on inﬂation and output stability, the optimal rule with perfect
information has an index value of 0.84.20 This compares with 0.47 for the eﬃcient
rule in the presence of mismeasurement such as seen in the data in the 1980s and
early 1990s. And while the more activist rule is by design optimal under perfect in-
formation, it yields asymptotic standard deviations for inﬂation and output that are
about 10 percent higher than those corresponding to its less activist counterpart.21
These comparisons suggest that the reduction in policy activism that followed Vol-
cker’s appointment could explain, at least in part, the improved performance of the
20This is based on the values reported in Table 3 for the preference weight ω =0 .5 in Orphanides
(1998). The index monotonically increases with the relative preference towards greater output sta-
bility.
21The eﬃcient degree of policy activism varies greatly with the magnitude of mismeasurement.
Thus, with greater mismeasurement, such as in the 1970s, the eﬃcient policy is even less activist
and the performance loss associated with the activist rule greater. On the other hand, with better
measurement more activist rules would be eﬃcient. Thus, if a reduction in the volatility of the
economy (as suggested in the studies mentioned in footnote 1) reduces the variance of yt|t and its
associated measurement error, more activist rules would be eﬃcient relative to the rules that would




economy during the Long Boom.
An intuitive understanding of the “stop-go” problem, as it applies to the 1970s, can
be gained simply by returning to Figure 5 and relating the path of policy to the
output gap as perceived in real-time, and as suggested by the ex post constructs. A
useful starting point is the recession of 1970. At the turn of the year, as signs of
a recession appeared, monetary policy started on a path of policy easings to restore
economic growth. But how long could policy maintain an expansionary stance without
facing a threat of worsening inﬂation from an overheated economy? Looking at the
ex post constructs in Figure 5, by early 1972 output had returned to its trend and
the expansionary stance should have been long reversed. Based on the real-time
perceptions of the output gap, however, the economy did not appear overexpanded
even much later. The resulting policy activism ignited inﬂation—the go phase of the
policy error. With inﬂation rising, policy tightened signiﬁcantly by late 1973, raising
the real rate to about four percent. And with the economy already overextended,
this action could only bring about a recession—the stop phase of the policy error.22
In retrospect, by inappropriately chasing after an output target that was too high
relative to the economy’s potential, policy inadvertently pushed the economy beyond
its potential, fueling inﬂation, prompting an abrupt tightening which precipitated a
recession only to start the cycle once again.
4 What happened in 1979?
The cycle of “stop-go” policy errors was to be repeated once more near the end of
the 1970s. In 1977, when output had returned to its trend, according to the ex post
constructs presented in Figure 5, real interest rates were about zero. Perceptions in
real-time, however, did not suggest that the economy was overheated. Once again,
by responding to these perceived gaps, policy kept real interest rates too low for too
long.
In the second half of 1978, the FOMC recognized that the pace of economic expansion
was too rapid while inﬂationary pressures were not abating. A weakening dollar
elevated concerns that inﬂation and inﬂation expectations would remain high even
22Surely, the energy crisis and other shocks contributed importantly to the dismal outcomes of
1974 and 1975. The argument here simply points out that at least part of the inﬂationary problem
and economic slowdown can be traced to the earlier policy mistakes. Barsky and Kilian (2001),
Lansing (2001), and Orphanides (2000) provide counterfactual model simulations that attribute a
large part of the problem during this period to such policy errors. Barsky and Kilian, in particular,




if economic growth were to be brought down in line with the economy’s potential
supply. Reﬂecting these concerns, the Committee raised interest rates in a series of
policy moves, aiming to curb inﬂation in the following year.
The situation at the turn of the year was described in the ﬁrst Humphrey-Hawkins
Report, submitted to the Congress on February 20, 1979:
The narrowing of the gap between actual and potential output implies that
a tighter hold on the nation’s aggregate demand for goods and services is
necessary if inﬂationary forces are to be contained.
...
Real GNP increased 4.3 percent from the fourth quarter of 1977 to the
fourth quarter of 1978—a bit slower than the average pace over the earlier
part of the expansion, but still well above the trend growth of potential
output in the economy (p. 33-34).23
The Committee’s outlook in the Report exhibited cautious optimism, noting that
“...it should be possible to slow the pace of expansion—and thereby relieve inﬂationary
pressures—without prompting a recession.” (p. 54). However, as the Record of Policy
Actions for the February Meeting revealed soon after, some members harbored less
sanguine views of the outlook. On one side, “a few members ... suggested that the
onset of a recession before the end of the year ... was the most likely development” (p.
128). But others recognized a serious danger that inﬂation could intensify further.
Both risks appeared well justiﬁed. As the year progressed, the Committee was once
again facing the cruel dilemma of stagﬂation. Already by March, both inﬂation
and economic weakness risks had deteriorated. The record of the March 20 meeting
indicates that “many members” (as opposed to the “few members” who had expressed
a similar concern in February) “believed that the chances of a recession beginning
before the end of the year or in early 1980 were fairly high” (p. 138). Regarding the
inﬂation outlook, signiﬁcant disagreements became evident. One view was that the
“slackening of economic activity later in the year could be expected to slow the rise
of prices generally,” but another view was that “inﬂation would remain rapid even
during a recession,” (p. 139). The meeting concluded with a decision not to change
policy, but on a very close vote, with 6 votes in favor of the adopted directive, and 4
dissents in favor of a more restrictive policy. Incoming data prior to the April 17 and
May 22 FOMC meetings continued to reinforce both concern of additional economic
weakness and concerns regarding heightened inﬂation. In May, this resulted in an
23Page numbers for references to the Humphrey-Hawkins reports, and Records of Policy Actions




unusual split of the vote, with two dissents favoring an easing and one favoring a
tightening.
By the July 11 meeting, the situation appeared to have markedly deteriorated on
both fronts. According to the record for the meeting, “no member of the Committee
expressed disagreement with the staﬀ appraisal that real gross national product had
declined somewhat in the second quarter and that further declines were likely for
the remaining two quarters of the year” (p. 171). The Humphrey-Hawkins Report,
submitted to the Congress on July 17, noted that the consensus projection of Board
members for real GNP growth for 1979 was −2t o−1/2 percent. Despite this dismal
outlook, however, inﬂationary concerns were getting even worse, and started to shift
the Committee’s view of the balance of risks squarely in that direction. Among a
number of factors cited for intensiﬁed inﬂationary pressures, most important was
continuing unexpected increases in oil prices, and a decline in the value of the dollar.
In some ways, July 1979 marked a small but important turning point. Despite the
view that the economy was likely already in recession, by the end of the month the
Committee had raised the federal funds rate twice, ﬁrst on July 19and then again on
July 27. Soon after, starting with Paul Volcker’s ﬁrst meeting as chairman on August
14, the Committee moved even more decidedly in a tightening direction, despite the
fact that the outlook for the economy appeared, if anything, even more uncertain.
The Policy Record of the August 14 meeting oﬀers a glimpse of the unpleasant choices:
In considering policy for the period immediately ahead, Committee mem-
bers focused on the problems posed by emerging recession and its potential
for substantial increases in unemployment, concurrent with strong mone-
tary growth, high actual and expected rates of inﬂation, and an exposed
position of the dollar in foreign exchange markets pending anticipated
improvement in the U.S. foreign trade and current accounts. Any policy
course in these circumstances necessarily involved unusual risks: prompt
pursuit of a policy aimed at moderating the eﬀects of the curtailment in
output could be perceived as exacerbating inﬂation and thus could have
perverse eﬀects on economic activity and employment; a policy directed
toward moderating inﬂation and lending support to the dollar in the for-
eign exchange markets could risk intensifying the recession (p. 183).
By moving decisively towards tightening, the Committee demonstrated that during
the course of the summer policy had shifted in a subtle way, from the reluctance
to raise interest rates in the face of concerns of economic weakness, to a focus on
inﬂation. By October, the famous change in operating procedures further solidiﬁed




Looking back, the delay in tightening policy during the ﬁrst half of the year proved
a costly mistake. Despite all the fears and concerns, the widely anticipated recession
that kept the Committee from tightening during the ﬁrst half of the year did not
arrive. Despite the pessimism and gloomy forecasts for 1979, the economy grew
in every quarter. By not tightening, the Committee compounded its earlier errors,
allowing inﬂation to accelerate further only to postpone and raise the costs of restoring
stability.
But this lesson was not lost on the Committee. In his ﬁrst Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony, on February 19, 1980, Chairman Volcker explained the subtle policy shift
that had taken place:
In the past, at critical junctures for economic stabilization policy, we have
usually been more preoccupied with the possibility of near-term weakness
in economic activity or other objectives than with the implications of our
actions for future inﬂation. To some degree, that has been true even
during the long period of expansion since 1975. As a consequence, ﬁscal
and monetary policies alike too often have been prematurely or excessively
stimulative, or insuﬃciently restrictive. The result has been our now
chronic inﬂationary problem, with a growing conviction on the part of
many that this process is likely to continue.
...
The broad objective of policy must be to break that ominous pattern.
That is why dealing with inﬂation has properly been elevated to a position
of high national priority. Success will require that policy be consistently
and persistently oriented to that end. Vacillation and procrastination,
out of fears of recession or otherwise, would run grave risks. Amid the
present uncertainties, stimulative policies could well be misdirected in the
short run; more importantly, far from assuring more growth over time, by
aggravating the inﬂationary process and psychology they would threaten
more instability and unemployment. (Federal Reserve Board, 1980b, p.
214)
It is easy to understate the signiﬁcance of the change Volcker articulated in this
testimony. As the NBER later conﬁrmed, the economy had already peaked in January
and was in recession during the ﬁrst half of 1980. But by then, the Chairman was not
about to recommend repeating the policy errors of the recent past. The Committee





In retrospect, there is little doubt that monetary policy during the Great Inﬂation
was too activist, placing too much emphasis on short-run stabilization of economic
activity at the expense of the Federal Reserve’s long-term price stability objective.
However, policy was not ﬂawed in an obvious manner; indeed it would appear en-
tirely reasonable from the perspective of many modern policy-evaluation analyses. In
theory, the activist approach to monetary policy that was followed during the Great
Inﬂation would be workable, if only policymakers could have a solid understanding
of the structure of the economy and reliable readings of the state of the economy
upon which to base their actions. But what works in theory, often works in theory
only. In reality, policymakers did not possess the knowledge necessary for an activist
approach to monetary policy. Regrettably, they also lacked an appreciation of their
ignorance. Despite the best of intentions, monetary policy itself became the engine
of inﬂation and a source of instability during the Great Inﬂation.
The subtle policy change in 1979 reﬂected a shift to more modest but attainable
goals. Reducing the excessive emphasis on stabilizing the level of economic activity
around its uncertain potential and concentrating instead on the inﬂation outlook for
policy guidance provided the foundation for stable sustainable growth. This allowed
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αβγρ S E E ¯ R2
i =1
1966:1–1979:2 1.53 1.64 0.57 0.70 0.81 0.86
(1.31) (0.38) (0.12) (0.07)
1979:3–1995:4 1.31 1.80 0.27 0.791 .190 .90
(1.84) (0.48) (0.30) (0.11)
i =2
1966:1–1979:2 2.12 1.61 0.60 0.67 0.80 0.87
(1.39) (0.36) (0.13) (0.08)
1979:3–1995:4 1.07 1.85 0.24 0.78 1.18 0.90
(1.83) (0.50) (0.23) (0.09)
i =3
1966:1–1979:2 2.13 1.65 0.62 0.690 .88 0.85
(1.80) (0.42) (0.15) (0.08)
1979:3–1995:4 0.80 1.890 .190 .76 1.17 0.90
(1.56) (0.43) (0.19) (0.07)
i =4
1966:1–1979:2 3.53 1.44 0.61 0.72 0.950 .84
(1.85) (0.41) (0.21) (0.10)
1979:3–1995:4 0.54 1.950 .17 0.74 1.14 0.90
(1.41) (0.38) (0.15) (0.05)
Notes: The table presents NLLS estimates of:
ft = ρft−1 +( 1− ρ)(α + βπt,i|t + γyt|t)+ηt
for i ∈{ 1,2,3,4}. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ft is the federal funds rate
(in percent per year), yt|t the output gap estimate for quarter t (in percent), and πt,i|t
the forecast of inﬂation from quarter t to quarter t + i (in percent per year). All
regressions for the 1979:3–1995:4 sample have 66 observations. For the 1966:1–1979:2
sample, 52, 44, 36 and 28 observations are available for the 1-, 2-, 3- and 4-quarter




P-values of Subsample Stability Tests
Forecast Horizon
1234
All parameters 0.068 0.046 0.0190 .022
α 0.217 0.318 0.155 0.142
β 0.316 0.334 0.163 0.111
γ 0.033 0.014 0.003 0.002
ρ 0.127 0.081 0.156 0.476
Notes: The entries reﬂect p-values of parameter stability tests across the subsamples
1966:1–1979:2 and 1979:3–1995:4. Columns correspond to the four alternative forecast
horizons examined. For each horizon, the ﬁrst row examines the hypothesis of joint
constancy of all parameters as shown in Table 1. Each of the remaining rows examines
the hypothesis that the speciﬁc parameter shown is constant, under the assumption







1966:1–1979:2 0.900 .99 0.951 .37
(0.40) (0.48) (0.51) (1.04)
1979:3–1995:4 0.34 0.28 0.21 0.18
(0.45) (0.78) (0.22) (0.16)
Notes: The index is computed as γ/(β −1). Entries are based on the parameter esti-
mates shown in Table 1 for the corresponding forecast horizons and sample periods.





























Notes: Inﬂation reﬂects the quarterly change in the chain-weighted GDP price index
(January 2001 data, percent annual rate). The federal funds rate is the quarterly
average of daily eﬀective rates. The solid and dashed vertical lines represent NBER





















1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Percent
Real Federal Funds Rate
Inflation Forecast
Notes: The inﬂation forecast is the one-quarter-ahead forecast of the change in the
implicit output deﬂator (percent annual rate). The real rate is the federal funds rate

























Notes: The output gap shown is based on within-quarter forecasts for the quarter































Notes: The estimated notional targets correspond to the estimates for the one-



































Notes: The real-time output gap shown is based on within-quarter forecasts for the
quarter shown. The HP Trend and Quadratic Trend concepts reﬂect detrending of

























Notes: The one-quarter-ahead forecast of inﬂation is from Figure 2. The ex post
actual rate of inﬂation is that shown in Figure 1, shifted one quarter to allow a direct
comparison with the forecast.	
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